Introduction
The government's budget constraint and the interplay between its components across time and states is at the core of macroeconomic questions. The nature and timing of taxes, the ability to and advisability of borrowing, the proper structure of government liabilities, are all recurrent themes. The purpose of this paper is to present a particular historical episode which uniquely illustrates them.
The episode takes place in the early eighteenth century in France. From 1716 to 1720, a Scotsman named John Law was given the means to undertake a radical restructuring of French public finances. Because the entire operation appeared to be based on rational principles, it has been called his "System." The operation led among other things to the complete replacement of metallic money with unbacked paper money, and the substitution of equity in a private company for government interest-bearing debt. The System ultimately unravelled with a coincident, and dramatic, fall in the market value of both the money and the equity.
John Law's System, also known as the Mississippi Bubble, ranks as one of the mythical early bubbles (Garber 1990 (Garber , 2000 . It also represents one of the most daring experiments in public finance, carried out by a man who had thought long and hard about monetary theory.
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In spite of the fascination that the story has long exerted, 2 it bears another retelling, because major features have not been highlighted and important questions remain unanswered. The paper proceeds as follows. I first briefly describe the French fiscal system and practices in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, so as to know what John Law was restructuring. I then describe the steps involved in the construction of Law's System and its collapse. I then conclude.
Features of French Fiscal System
A long tradition in macroeconomics takes as given the process governing the government's spending obligations. The main characteristics of the process faced by France in the early modern period (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) can best be seen by dividing government spending into military and nonmilitary components (net of debt-related spending). The way accounts were kept distinguished spending in various ways: in some accounts, expenditures are divided by the treasurer who made the payments. More generally, the government distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary expenditures. The former were the recurrent, stable, and predictable items; the latter were temporary and unexpected items. Thus, my category of military spending includes ordinary items like peacetime garrisons and troops, upkeep of fortresses, horse-farms, and the like, as well as all extraordinary items related to wars. Nonmilitary spending net of debt-related items includes mostly expenditures of the royal household (X%) and salaries and wages of government employees. The pattern is shown in Figure 1 . The main source of variation in government spending comes from wars. Peacetime expenditures (standing army and non-war related expenditures, mostly labor costs of providing justice, police, etc) are stable, and small compared to wartime expenditures. The main wars of Louis XIV are easily spotted on the graph: the conflicts appear to become both longer and more costly over time, culminating in the War of Spanish Succession. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the primary surplus (revenues less non-debt spending), while Figure 3 compares revenues with spending inclusive of debt service. The French government raised taxes to some extent in wartime (notably introducing an income tax at a critical moment in the last war of Louis XIV's reign, in 1710). It also resorted to a lot of borrowing.
Taxes
Fiscal revenues consisted of a mixture of direct (income or wealth) taxes, indirect (consumption) taxes, and feudal dues arising from the royal demesne. The assessment and collection of these revenues was decentralized. For direct taxes, a global amount was set by the government, and then broken down into assessments for each province, where local authorities would proceed with the next level of assessment, and so on to the local level. For indirect taxes, collection was carried out by tax farmers. The right to collect a given tax for a specific period (the duration of the lease) was auctioned off to the highest bidder. The bidder's bid represented the annual amount he was committed to pay to the royal treasury, no matter what the amount actually collected would turn out to be. In the 1680s, most farming contracts were consolidated into a single 6-year contract called the "united farms." But new taxes were later created and usually farmed out separately. Table 1 presents fiscal revenues in selected peacetime years.
Spending is decentralized as well to various treasurers. Each tax had an associated bureaucracy of collectors and treasurers, either government employees or officers (direct taxes) or employees of the tax farmer. The treasurers spent some of the monies they collected, upon presentation of payment orders emanating from the government, and turned over the remainder, if any, to the royal treasury in Paris.
Borrowing takes several forms:
• short-term borrowing: interest-bearing notes (claims against various treasurers)
• long-term borrowing: offices and perpetual (but callable) bonds ("rents"). Interest payment is paid out of specific tax income before the latter is sent to the treasury (debt is "funded").
• tax-cum-loan: a new tax is created for limited time, its collection is farmed, the farmer pays up-front the net present value • bonds carry high transaction costs at resale. Late 17th c. innovations: lottery loans, life annuities.
France in 1715
In 1715, Louis XIV dies after a reign of 72 years. The War of Spanish Succession ended with a draw, but it had proven very costly for France. At his death, Louis XIV left debts of 2800m livres of which 1068m were in perpetual annuities (bonds with coupon payments that go on forever), 830m in sold offices (the "wages" paid to the officer being the interest on the price of the office), and 920m in floating debt (various notes and bills whose final payment had not been settled, some of which bore interest in the meantime). The interest payments amounted to 45m for the annuities and 41.5m for the offices. With revenues at 166m and spending at 146m, the primary surplus was only 20m, to service at least 86.5m in debt service, without even taking care of the floating debt which would add 35 or 40m at a 4% interest. The burden of debt seems enormous in proportion to the government's resources. It would be desirable to compare to some measure of output as well, but these are hard to come by. Riley and McCusker (1983, 281, Chart 1) give a population of 21.5m in 1700 and 130L per capita output in 1700, corresponding to a total 2800m for output, about the same as the face value of the debt. Britain's debt burden was lower, both on the government's finances and on the country's resources. In 1715 the primary surplus was £2.5m, against a debt charge of £3.2m. Total debt of around £38m in 1716 compared to output of around £60m (Mitchell 1988, 575, 578, 600) .
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At Louis XIV's death his great-grandson and successor Louis XV was only 5 years old, and a regency was installed, with the late king's nephew the duke of Orléans as regent. Immediately, a series of measures were taken by the regent's minister, the duke of Noailles.
One of the first was a massive, overnight devaluation of the livre by 30% on December 23, 1715. Another devaluation took place on May 31, 1718, this time by 1/3. Both measures reduced some expenses, but they also reduced revenues as well. The main advantage, in the short-term, was to force coin holders to submit to a seigniorage rate of 20-30%.
Partial defaults in October 1715 (on perpetual bonds), January 1716 (on wages of offices), April 1716 (on the floating debt), and in June 1717 (on the perpetual bonds) cut 7m from the debt service and brought the debt down to 2bn. The floating debt was converted into 250m in bearer notes called billets d'Etat, most bearing 4%, and with no definite redemption date. Although there was still some 240m in unfunded arrears and floating debt, debt service was now at 92.5m. A special levy on "profiteers" was assessed through a special court (see White 2001) . In spite of the politically necessary end to the war-time 10% tax on income in 1717, spending cuts (particularly in the military) brought the primary surplus to 93.5m. By 1718, after the second devaluation, French finances were in a precarious balanced state. Riley (1987) . * : imputed from the interest payment, assuming the same average rate as in 1717. The livre index measures the silver content of the unit of account (1 in 1726).
Law's Système: an overview
John Law reached France some months before the death of Louis XIV, and immediately submitted proposals to finance ministers. The death of the old king and the sacking of the finance minister Desmarets postponed briefly his In the midst of this situation, John Law successfully approached the Regent with a plan to set up a bank that would help the government manage its debt, on the model of the Bank of England. Law's beginnings were modest, but progressively the various companies he created merged into a gigantic conglomerate that had taken over most of the fiscal activities of the French state. John Law's experiment in public finance lasted from the creation of his General Bank in May 1716 to his escape from France in December 1720. Whether or not he was following a coherent plan inspired by his theoretical writings, or whether he was improvising as he went along, his scheme became known as a "System." There are four stages in the history of the System. The first stage, from 1716 to 1718, established a privately owned bank that successfully issued bank notes. The second stage, from 1717 to 1719, saw the parallel formation of a trading company, whose shares were publicly traded, and whose purpose shifted from colonial development and overseas trading to management of public funds. In the third stage, from 1719 to 1720, the bank and the company merged, John Law became finance minister, the company reimbursed the whole national debt, and its notes became the sole currency. The final stage, the year 1720, is the period of collapse, followed by a complex cleaning-up operation.
3 John Law's Système (1): the Bank
The General Bank, May 1716
The first step was the creation of the General Bank in May 1716. John Law had initially proposed a 100%-reserve public bank that would handle the government's financial transactions, but the plan was rejected in October 1715. The Regent, sympathetic to Law, allowed him to set up a purely private bank, at Law's own risks. The Bank's capital was raised by an IPO: 900 shares were offered at 5,000L each, payable mostly in billets d'Etat at face value (which stood at a 60% market discount to their face value at the time) and the rest in cash; John Law himself bought 300 shares.
5 Moreover, only 1/4 of the purchase price was required immediately, the rest payable at some future date. Thus, it took only 690L in cash to initially buy a share. The Bank's assets consisted initially of 375,000L in cash and 1.125mL in billets d'Etat, the interest on which was used by the Bank as working capital (which only amounted to 45,000L per year). It is not clear if the remainder of the 5 The share of billets in the purchase price was not specified by the letters patent creating the bank. subscription price was ever paid by shareholders.
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The Bank was structured similarly to a modern limited liability company. A general assembly was to be held twice a year with dividend distribution. Shareholders voted in proportion to their shareholdings, management was responsible to them, etc.
The Bank's main activities were to discount bills, sell foreign exchange, take deposits and manage current accounts (charging a fee of 0.025% on transfers between accounts and on cash payment orders), and issue notes payable in specific silver coins (écus) on demand to the bearer. It was not allowed to engage in trade or to borrow.
The Bank notes
Getting the notes to circulate, and not return constantly to the Bank for redemption, was critical to the Bank's profitability. The Regent and several influential and wealthy backers seemed to have played a role in this, by depositing large sums at the very early stages; so the first note issues were made against deposits, not discounting, and the depositors were willing to hold the notes they received and not redeem them.
More importantly, various measures were taken by the government to enhance the attractiveness of the notes. A decree of 7 Oct 1716 ordered that the various tax collectors redeem the bank notes into cash on demand. This enrolled the vast network of hundreds of tax collectors and tax accountants throughout France into unpaid branches of the General Bank. On April 10, 1717, a decree made the bank notes legal tender in payment of taxes at face value. On Sept. 12, the government's tax accountants and cashiers were to keep accounts and make receipts and payments in notes.
The notes, denominated inécus, provided protection against a particular type of monetary manipulation, namely devaluation of the silver coinage. It worked as follows.
The bank notes it issued were in denominations of 10écus, 100écus and 1,000écus. Thé ecu was the standard silver coin. In 1718, it was minted at 16 to a pound of silver, and its face value was 5L. So a 100écus note was a claim to 100/16 pounds of silver, and had a legal tender value of 500L. The bank notes had the following promise written on it: "the Bank promises to pay on sight to the bearer 100écus of the weight and fineness of date X" where X was the date of issue of the note. In other words, the bank notes were claims to a specific quantity of a specific coin of a specific weight.
When new silverécus were issued in June 1718 of lighter weight (20 to a pound of silver) and higher face value (6L), the oldécus were given a new value of 6L until August 1 and were demonetized afterward (and hence worth their silver weight, 5L at the prevailing mint price). Thus, the holder of 100écus had 500L in coins before May 1718, but suddenly found himself owning a pile of silver which would soon be worthless as coin, and which the mint would take back for 500L (in new coins).
6 Murphy (1997, 158 ) says it was not, but the declaration of 4 Dec 1718 which nationalized the Bank states (art. 2) that the 6mL in billets d'Etat had been invested in shares of the Company of the West, and the Bank's account of 1723 lists dividend payments on 12,000 such shares (Harsin 1928, 309) . Hence the subscriptions must have been paid in full.
A decree made clear that, since the oldécus were circulating at 6L like the new ones, an old 100écus note would be taken to be worth 600L by tax collectors ("les billets de la Banque seront pris en paiement et acquittés [...] sur le pied de 6 livres l'écu").
7 The holder of a 100écus note, then, saw his holdings in unit of account increased from 500L to 600L, and was thus clearly better off than the holder of coins. 8 This feature made the note an attractive way to hold money balances. The result was that the Bank was able to issue a fairly large amount of notes, 40-50m per year on average, while maintaining a reasonable specie reserve (about 50%). When the Bank was converted to a Royal Bank in December 1718, it had 39.5mL in circulation. If it held 50% of the corresponding assets in specie and the rest in bills yielding 4 to 6% (the discount rate it charged), the income should have been about 1,000L per share annually.
The Bank's "nationalization" in December 1718
The Bank appeared successful in getting its notes to circulate. Its total dividend payments (3 half-yearly payments from 1716 to 1718) amounted to 615L, a respectable 15% rate of return on the cash price of the initial shares, although not as high as one would expect given the note circulation. It succeeded in lowering the commercial paper rate in Paris, because the Bank successfully discounted at rates from 4 to 6%. By late 1718, the Regent was convinced that the Bank was a profitable enterprise, and accepted Law's suggestion to nationalize it. The Regent, on behalf of the king, bought out all the existing shareholders in cash at the face value of the shares (5,000L). The operation was made public by a declaration of 4 Dec 1718. The Bank would henceforth be managed by Law on behalf of the king, and all profits turned over to the Royal Treasury.
For a shareholder who was bought out in December 1718 by the King, the rate of return on his investment over 18 months was an annualized 64%, a very good deal indeed.
John Law's Système (2): The Company
Meanwhile, John Law also secured the Regent's approval for the creation of a trading company, the Company of the West (Compagnie d'Occident), in August 1717. The Company's initial business was to develop Louisiana. This was a common arrangement by which European rulers had developed their colonies in the Americas and elsewhere: the rights to develop the colony are granted to a private entrepreneur or a company, who is given monopoly rights to ensure profitability. The ruler generally profits by receiving a payment from the 7 AC June 1, 1718. This was the legal tender value in payment of The notes issued after June 1718 were claims to 100 newécus, or 100/20 pounds of silver, and were also legal tender for 600L. But since the old notes and the new notes were claims to different quantities of metal, they were considered different. entrepreneur, and eventually by increasing his tax base as the colony prospers. Also, since the early 17th century, it was thought that long-distance trade such as trade with India and the Far-East could only be carried out by large companies with monopoly rights, such as the Indies Companies of England and the Netherlands. The French Company was following the same model.
Louisiana was ceded to the Company as a fief in perpetuity; 9 moreover, the Company had a 25-year monopoly on trading with the colony, 10 as well as on the profitable beaver fur trade in Canada. The Company was allowed to raise a private army, to enter into treaties with the Native Americans, and to call on the government for military assistance against other European powers. At the expiration of the monopoly, it would retain ownership of the colony but it would have to sell any forts and military equipment to the king. Again, shares were issued, this time payable 100% in billets d'Etat. The Company had an arrangement with the government to convert the billets (a total of 100m at face value, bearing 4% interest) into perpetual bonds, with interest accruing from Jan 1717. This served as working capital of 4m per year. The first dividend was not payable until July 1718. Thus the 4mL was available to the Company for about a year before a payment was due to the shareholders.
The IPO began on September 14, 1717 and 29mL had been subscribed within two weeks, but of that amount 13.3mL were bought by Law himself. After that, subscriptions were very slow, and dragged into 1718. In June 1718 measures were taken up to speed up payment, and the subscription was closed on Dec 31, 1718, with 100mL sold; of that, 40% was owned by the King.
M & As galore
From its creation, Law's Company grew by a series of mergers and acquisitions, and extended its activities from trade to tax collection:
• 1 Aug 1718: the Company purchased the right to run the tobacco monopoly for 4.02m per year.
• 4 Dec 1718: it bought the Company of the Senegal for 1.6m cash.
• May 1719: the Company bought the Company of the Indies and the Company of China for its net worth (to be assessed; it turned out to be 1.5m, Haudrère 102).
• Jul 1719: it received the Company of Africa's privilege on trade with North Africa. The price was 68,000L plus the value of assets (which turned out to be 150,000L, Haudrère 129).
• 25 Jul 1719: it purchased the right to run the royal mints. The company paid a lump sum of 50m to run the mints for 9 years. (The sum was never paid in cash but used to retire government bonds.)
• 27 Aug 1719: it bought the right to run the Fermes Générales (General Farms), which collected most of the excise taxes in France and about 30% of government revenues. The lease was to run for 9 years, and be worth 52m per year (instead of 48.5m previously). The same day, its charter and privileges were extended for 50 years.
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• late Aug 1719: it bought out the officers in charge of collecting all direct taxes (recettes générales, about 55% of revenues).
• Feb 1720: it took over the Royal Bank.
• Sept. 1720: it bought out the Company of Santo Domingo and received the monopoly on the slave trade in Guinea.
Tax collection was, as described above, run by private firms on behalf of the government. The procedure was much like the one in place since Medieval times for running the royal mints. The right to collect a given tax (say, the tax on salt, or the tax on wine) was auctioned to the highest bidder. The bidder offered a fixed annual payment to the king for the duration of the lease. Meanwhile, he took upon himself to collect the tax, hiring all the necessary employees. Any shortfall in revenues from the promised sum was made up by the entrepreneur; conversely, any revenue collected above and beyond the price of the lease was retained as profit by the entrepreneur. This system of tax farming was quite common in Early Modern Europe. Government monopolies, such as the monopoly on tobacco, could also be farmed out in the same fashion. The tax farms bought by John Law's Indies Company were operated in the same way, in exchange for a fixed annual payment to the King.
The various companies and tax leases were bought for relatively small amounts. Law's justification was that they were inefficiently run, and therefore underpriced. He expected to run them more efficiently (for example, the tobacco lease, which cost 4m a year, was expected to generate 6 to 8m per year) and thus create enough profit to justify the high dividends he was promising. These acquisitions were financed by successive issues of shares. Every time, the shares were payable in monthly installments. The successive offered prices were increasingly high, although each new share had equal standing with the older shares, and was in particular entitled to the same dividend.
Here is the list of successive share issues of the Company:
• June 1717-Dec 1718 (IPO): 200,000 shares at 500L each, payable in government bonds (billets d'État) at face value
• June 1719: 50,000 at 550L each in cash, 50L down and the rest payable in 20 monthly installments
• July 1719: 50,000 at 1,000L each in cash, payable in 20 monthly installments
• Sep-Oct 1719: 300,000 at 5,000L each in cash, payable in 10 monthly installments.
The June and July 1719 issues took the form of a rights offering: a subscriber to the June issue had to own 4 original shares (which came to be known as the "mothers", as opposed to the July shares known as "daughters" ), and a subscriber to the July issue had to own 4 mothers and 1 daughter to purchase 1 "granddaughter." This requirement helped turn the secondary market in the older shares into a frenzy. Law also demonstrated the profits to be made in a bull market by introducing Parisians to options, buying call options on shares of the Company in March-April 1719, and cashing in after the merger with the Indies Company had helped boost the price of his Company.
After making a down-payment, a subscriber received a certificate that entitled him to a share upon full payment of all the installments. By missing an installment he forfeited his share, and all previous payments made. This feature, noted by Cochrane (2001) , made the certificates (or soumissions) into options on shares rather than shares, with a strike price paid over time. This feature proved crucial in late 1719.
The billets d'État received with the first issue (100m at face value, bearing 4%) were supposed to provide 4m per year in cash-flow. But they were used to buy the tobacco monopoly in August 1718. The other source of financing for the Company's acquisitions was note issues by the Bank, which was managed by the same people (and eventually merged into the Company in February 1720). In December 1718, the General Bank's note issue had stood at 40m livres; by July 1719, the Royal Bank's issue stood at 400m livres, and reached 1bn in January 1720. It appears that the Bank simply lent notes to the Company in exchange for IOUs (recépissés) signed by the treasurer of the Company (see Harsin 1928, 310) . Figure 4 shows the price of shares in the Company for the period in which daily quotations are available.
12 Prior to August 1719, we have only random indications of the price of shares: 250L in May 1718, 500 on May 10, 1719 (Lüthy 1:310), 650 on June 17, 1000 and above on July 17 (Murphy 1997, 190, 194) . It thus appears that the successive share issues were offered at close to market prices.
John Law's Système (3): the apex
Law's System reached its apex between the summer of 1719 and March 1720. Two main elements crowned the system. The first was a virtual takeover of the French government, by which the Company substituted its shares for the whole national debt. The second was the substitution of the Company's liabilities for the metallic currency. At the end of the operation, the Company, owned by the former creditors of the State, collected all taxes, owned or managed most overseas colonies, monopolized all overseas trade, and freely issued fiat money which was sole legal tender. Its CEO also became minister of finance on January 5, 1720.
Conversion of the national debt
The final component of John Law's Système (as it came to be called) fell into place, starting on 27 August 1719. This was the conversion of government debt into liabilities of the Company, which was decided jointly with the takeover of the Fermes Générales. Formally, the conversion took place as follows. The Company initially made an offer to the government, namely, a loan of 1200m livres (raised on 17 September and 10 October to 1600m livres) at 3%.
13 Between the government and the Company, the loan took the form of a perpetual rent at 3% owed by the king to the Company, assigned on the revenues of the General Farms. The annual 36m livres payment (raised to 48m) would in practice be deducted from the annual lease payment of 52m livres that the Company owed for collecting the taxes of the General Farms. The government would use the 1600m livres to buy out the funded government debt (that is, the existing stock of perpetual rents) and miscellaneous other debts, listed in Table 4. 14 This buy-out was compulsory, but perfectly legal. Perpetual rents and offices, by their legal nature, included a call option: the creditor could never demand repayment of the capital, but the debtor could reimburse at any time.
15 Bondholders would receive drafts from the Royal Treasury on the Company in the amount of their holdings, payable by the Company's treasurer in specie or bank notes at the bondholder's option. Of course, the company did not have such a vast amount of cash on hand. To raise the funds, it was authorized at the same time to borrow the same amount (1200m livres) from the public by selling 3% bonds. Before the repayment of the debt was announced, the Company's share stood at 3600 livres. By September 9, it stood at 5350. Two days later, the Company asked the government permission to raise 500m livres by selling shares, at 5000 each in cash. The success of the share issue led to other share issues (September 26, October 2) totalling another 1000m livres. Furthermore, shares ceased to be sold for cash; instead, only drafts issued by the Treasury to bondholders and other government bearer debt were accepted. It seems the bonds were never issued by the Company.
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In other words, since government bonds were accepted in payment of the shares, the operation was simply a gigantic swap of government bonds, bearing on average 4.5%, for Company equity. The company's profits came from the 3% interest it was owed by the government, plus any profits on its commercial and tax-farming activities.
The end result of the process was that the company collected about 90% of taxes in France, passed on a fixed nominal amount to the government, and distributed the rest as dividends to its shareholders.
term notes bearing 4% issued by the Receveurs généraux, the billets d'Etat, and all offices and "charges" which had been abolished since 1711 or would be abolished, and whose reimbursement was not yet funded.
15 The king's debt to the Company created by the operation, as well as the bonds to be issued by the Company to raise funds, could not be called for at least 25 years.
16 There is some devate over what was offered to the public initially. The AC of 27 August authorized the company to sell either "actions rentières" to the bearer or perpetual rent contracts at 3%. The AC of August 31, announcing the reimbursement of the public debt, speaks of "actions" and "actions rentières" equivalently. Faure (1977) has read both "actions" and "actions rentières" to mean rent-like bearer securities, or bonds, emphasizing the "rentière" aspect, and argued that the share issues of September and October were not part of the original plan. For him, the 27-31 August decrees represent a conversion of government bonds into Company bonds at a lower interest (a "wise" plan). Murphy (1997, 200) emphasizes the "action" aspect and reads both terms to mean shares. But article 12 of the arrêt of 31 August prohibits the Company from amortizing the "actions rentières" for 25 years, a clause that makes no sense if they are shares. Moreover, the Company later issued "actions rentières" (on 23 February 1720), which were clearly bearer bonds paying a fixed interest, not shares (cf. the document published in Harsin (1928, 315) which distinguishes actions rentières and actions intéressées). Hence the word "rentière" cannot be dismissed as meaning "meant for rentiers," but rather indicates that the security bears a fixed income. The fact that bearer bonds were unknown at the time probably explains the choice of the word "action" to distinguish them from the traditional rent contracts. 
Money: paper competes with metal
Over the same period of time, the Royal Bank continued to be managed by John Law, although he was supposed to be working for the Treasury. Little is known about its management during this period, until it was outright merged with the Company in February 1720. It is likely that the Bank ceased to be a classic private bank and just became a tool in the hands of Law. Under what conditions did it issue notes is not clear: I suspect that it was freely lending to the Company.
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The notes issued by the Royal Bank became increasingly prominent, and quickly changed from being the liabilities of a private bank, claims denominated in fixed amounts of silver, to the status of sole legal tender, disconnected from any standard. This process was entirely consistent with Law's stated belief that metallic money was inferior and wasteful, and would better be replaced by paper money or by a highly liquid, interest-bearing security. A first step was taken on Jan 5, 1719, when new types of notes were issued, which were not denominated in specific coins, but rather in units of account, in sizes of 10L, 100L and 1,000L.
18 At the time, the silver coin was 6L and the gold coin was 30L, so the 10L notes were in direct competition with gold and even silver. The note stated: "The Bank promises to pay on demand to the bearer 100 livres tournois in silver coins" without saying how many coins. (See Figure 6) . Then, in April 1719, a decree explained that the new issue of ecu-denominated notes had not been met by any demand, and that olderécu-denominated 17 The bank's account drawn up in 1723 has an item of 1,857,588,347L "paid to the cashier of the Indies
Company"! (Harsin 1928, 310) .
18 Notes of 10,000L were authorized on 13 Sept. 1719.
notes were increasingly turned in to be converted into the new livre-denominated notes. It was therefore decided to cancel the former types of notes altogether and order the conversion of the remaining ones. The Bank's liabilities were therefore only denominated in units of account, although still payable on demand in silver.
As we have seen, monetary reforms in which the face value of coins was increased benefited debtors who had coins. The holder of a note denominated in coins (as were the notes before 1719) benefited to the same extent. With notes denominated in units of account, the benefit disappeared. But in the case of a monetary reform decreasing the value of coins, the holder of a note was protected against the loss in legal tender value. This was made clear by a decree of April 22, 1719 which stated that livres-denominated coins were not subject to changes in value in the case of a lowering of the value of coins. As if by coincidence, two weeks later a decrease in the value of gold coins was announced, from 36L to 35L; it was followed by further decreases from July to December, down to 32L. The silver coin was also decreased from 6L to 5.8L, then 5.6L, over the same period. At the same time, the king's tax collectors were advised that, in case of currency alteration, they would be responsible for the capital loss on their specie holdings to the Treasury.
The legal tender status of notes changed as well.
• On 27 Dec. 1718, transactions larger than 600L were to be made only in gold, or in bank notes in cities which had branch offices of the Bank. 19 The legal tender of silver coins was thus limited to 600L. Notes tendered in payment could not be refused, except if the local branch was not making payments in specie.
• From 25 July 1719, creditors in towns with branch offices 20 could refuse gold and silver payments, and demand payment in notes instead. Gold and silver were thus losing their legal tender status.
• From 1 Dec 1719, the Company itself would deal exclusively in notes, could demand payment in notes (in particular for all the taxes it was collecting) , and would only pay out notes. Its payments to the king would also be made in notes.
• On 21 Dec 1719 it was announced that no payments could be made in silver for more than 10L and in gold for more than 300L, effective immediately in Paris, from March 1 in cities with branch offices of the Bank, from April 1 everywhere else. All payments in cash were subject to a 5% premium over notes. Bills of exchange were payable in notes.
• On 28 Jan 1720 notes were given legal tender throughout France.
• On 27 Feb 1720 it was made illegal for anyone to own more than 500L in gold or silver coins, and no payment above 100L could be made other than in notes.
• On 1 April 1720 all gold and silver clauses in contracts were voided.
19 Those were Paris, Lyon, La Rochelle, Tours, Orlans, Amiens.
20 At the same time, branch offices were established in all cities in which a mint was located, about twenty.
The growth of the outstanding money stock is shown in Table 5 . The specie stock estimate of 500mL for 1689 would correspond to 1,100mL in 1719 livres (cf. the estimate of 1.2bnL in the AC of 27 Feb 1720). Interestingly, the decree of 1 December 1719 argues that the authorized issues of 640mL would be sufficient for "circulation and all operations of commerce." Within three months, the amount was tripled. Table 5 : Outstanding stock of notes, by denomination, and estimated circulation (in millions of livres). Column
(1) sums the previous columns and consists of notes issued less notes burned. Column (2) adjusts for the fact that some notes had been retired but not burned. Column (3) converts into current silver livres at the market value of notes, while column (4) converts column (3) into constant silver livres of 1719, at 60L per marc of silver. Sources: see Appendix.
Money: paper replaces metal
The complete elimination of gold and silver was announced on March 11. After May 1, it would be illegal for anyone but the heavily regulated goldsmiths to own gold in coin or bullion. Silver coin and bullion was also made illegal, from January 1 1721, except in the form of the lower denominations of 1.5L and below. At the same time, a planned for revaluating the livre in terms of silver was announced, whereby the 1L coin was progressively lowered in value to 0.5L by January 1. All silver was to be carried to the mint, where it would be purchased with a 20% seigniorage rate. All gold was also to be sold to the mint, at a rapidly decreasing price, in exchange for notes. 21 The Company would be the only one using gold and silver for foreign trade: import of gold and silver was made illegal. Silver would remain as mere subsidiary coinage, which would not even be convertible into notes (decree of April 6). The creation of a final silver coin was not without analogies with the earlier monetary reforms. The Company had a particular interest in the high seigniorage rate, since it was also running the mints, since July 25, 1719.In the original contract, the Company promised to pay 50m (from October 1719 to December 1720) in exchange for the profits of running the mints for nine years. The king pledged to not raise coins or reduce their fineness at any time during those nine years; and, should he lower the coins, he promised to lower the mint price at the same time (leaving intact the seigniorage rate, which had stood at 20% for silver and gold since October 1718). Both promises were to be broken repeatedly, two days later in fact concerning gold (Dutot 107 ), but most strikingly in January 1720 when seigniorage was set to 0. The March 1720 reform was a compensation for this lost income. 
Money and Prices
There are two ways to measure the depreciation of the paper currency. One is against its competitor, silver. The other is through a broad price index. For the latter, we have Hamilton's price index, based on commodities purchased by hospitals in Paris, shown in Figure 8 . For the former, we have foreign exchange data until September 1720, which can be converted into a price of paper livres for silver (ignoring many things). From June 1720 we have direct observations on the price of bank notes (by denomination) in terms of specie, although one must keep in mind that "specie" means "current silver livres" whose silver content changed several times over the period (see the graph of the mint equivalent). The result is shown in Figure 7 . Several features are worth noting in Figure 7 . First is the coherence of the foreignexchange based series (until September 1720) and the bank-note based series (from June 1720). In the period for which the two overlap, they track each other closely.
22 A second point is that, until October 1719, the foreign exchange series remains close to the mint price, that is, the silver import point. 23 By late January 1720, the foreign exchange series rises above the mint equivalent. But, as noted above, from January 1720 on, bills of exchange in London on Paris were actually claims to bank notes rather than silver coins, since they were payable in notes. The discrepancy thus measures indirectly the degree to which bank notes are depreciating with respect to silver. In this light, the devaluations of March 1720
22 The foreign-exchange series is originally in the form of English pence sterling per "écu de change," a fictitious unit corresponding to 3 livres (units of account). It is normalized so as to represent French livres per fixed quantity of silver, based on the official silver content of the English penny (62d per troy ounce of silver 92.5% fine). The bank-note series is originally in the form of livres of specie per 100L note. To plot the bank-note series on the same scale as the foreign-exchange series, the livres of specie are converted to their silver content as defined at each point in time by the laws.
(25%), April 1720 (11%), and July 1720 (44%) appear as attempts to bring the silver livre back into line with the paper livre. Figure 8 presents a puzzle, when it is plotted against the parameters of the silver coinage. The prices collected by Hamilton are prices in units of account, and the mint equivalent and mint price lines plotted against the left scale show the (inverse of) the silver content of the unit of account, and the (inverse of) the silver price of the unit of account. The price level and the silver content of the livre track each other quite well from 1711, when Hamilton's series begin, to 1718. The devaluation of 1718 does not have much of an immediate impact, however; but by late 1719 the price level seems to have caught up. Indeed, the remarkable rise of the price level in January 1720 (+25% in one month) visually corresponds to that "catching up." Hamilton's index continues to rise through 1720, but much more slowly, only 19% from January 1720 to the peak in August 1720. At the same time, the quantity of money in circulation multiplied by a factor of 2.6 (Table 5 ). The increase in money does not seem to show in overall prices. Faure (1977) presents considerable but anecdotal evidence from throughout France of price increases, particularly in commodities markets (Hamilton's data is drawn from hospital records). More work is needed here.
6 The Système (4): Collapse and Clean-up
Seeds of disaster (to May 1720)
It was a crucial aspect of Law's scheme that the share price remain high. The fact that bonds were converted into highly priced shares is what made the conversion profitable: as long as the PE ratio was higher than the comparable ratio on government bonds, the result was a lowering of the government's debt service. Moreover, the "call-option" feature of the subscriptions meant that bondholders could back out if the price of shares fell low enough, thus unravelling the scheme.
For these reasons, and also because the constantly rising price created attractive capital gains that made the successive share issues attractive, Law used various means to shore up the price of shares. By the fall of 1719, the Company was giving out low-interest loans against shares as collateral. It was also intervening directly in the market and buying up shares. As early as October 5, 1719 the Company had ordered its treasurer to buy any share offered at a price of 5000L (the spot price at the time). Then, in late December 1719, an office was formally opened at which shares and subscriptions could be bought and sold for prices determined each day by the Company. The office functioned with some interruptions until mid-February (Faure 1977, 340) . Over the course of the next two months the Company ended up buying 800mL worth of shares, or about 16% of the Company's capitalization.
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There is evidence that the former bondholders were not all in a hurry to convert their bonds into shares (Lüthy 1:320): on January 12 they were given a deadline of April 1 to receive their reimbursement, and on February 6 a new deadline of July 1 after which the interest on their bonds would be reduced to 2%.
The policy of price support was interrupted after a general Assembly on February 22. The effect on prices was immediate: from the support price of 9925L the market price of shares fell to 8500L by March 1, while the subscriptions fell from 660L to 5450L (Dutot 2000, 225) . Law quickly reversed course and, on March 5, opened another office for the buying and selling of shares at a fixed price of 9,000L. At the same time, the outstanding subscriptions lost their option and were all converted into shares, while reimbursements of the public debt continued to be made, but in bank notes. By late May 1720, the company had spent another 1213.5mL (Hautchamp 1743, 1:121) and bought back more than half of its stock, resulting in the increase in outstanding notes shown in Table 5 .
The devaluation of 21 May 1720
I mentioned earlier the monetary manipulations. In early March, Law effectively devalues the livre by 1/3, changing the face value of the recently issued 1-livre silver piece to 1.5L. This was the first monetary manipulation since May 1718, and it was followed within days by the plan for the full replacement of metal by paper, which included a gradual appreciation of the livre relative to silver above and beyond its previous level: the 1-livre piece was scheduled to be valued at 0.5L by January 1721. Figure 7 suggests that the devaluation of March 5, 1720 was merely ratifying the fall in the market exchange rate of the French livre (which meant the Bank's notes) relative to other metal-based currencies. If so, this represented a powerful warning sign of inflation, which Law somehow expected to contain by his demonetization plan. Indeed, he expected to engineer a serious deflation.
Law presumably realized the process by which shares were being replaced by legal tender notes. On May 21, an arrêt was published that represented a major change in the System. The preamble, drafted by Law himself 25 recites the achievements of the System, but attributes to "ill-disposed individuals" attempts to undermine it, and presents the devaluation of March 5 as a means supporting the credit of the System by depreciating the coinage, and the plan of March 11 as a means of restoring the proper foreign exchange rates. Such measures, he wrote, would necessarily induce a deflation in the prices of all goods and assets, and consequently a similar deflation was necessary for the System's liabilities. Thus, abandoning the tenet of constancy of the paper money, Law devalued both the shares and the notes by roughly equal amounts, in monthly stages, from 9000L to 5000L for the shares, and the shares down to a half of their face value by December 1. The Bank started converting its notes on demand at the new parity, but within days public outrage against the measures was growing; on May 27 the devaluation of May 21 was rescinded, and a few days later the planned demonetization of March 11 was halted, and the freedom to hold and use specie returned. On May 28 Law was fired and placed under house arrest, but within days he was freed and resumed his seat at the cabinet. Probably the Regent understood that no one but him could save the System.
Saving the System (May-November 1720)
Law never gave up hope, and from his recall on June 1, he tried to save the system. The primary goals were to reduce the quantity of notes in circulation and to save the Company (and Bank) from bankruptcy: a goal of withdrawing 600mL was set in June 1720. A series of measures thus aimed to withdraw notes from circulation and convert them into other, mostly non-demand liabilities of the Bank or the government: life annuities issued by the Company in May 1720, government annuities or rentes put on sale in June 1720, bank accounts created in July 1720, and a new issue of Company shares in August 1720. In the process, a distinction was made between high-denomination notes (1,000 and 10,000L), which represented 88% of the total issued by late May, and small-denomination notes (10, 50, and 100L): the thrust of the measures was to retire the former.
The new issue of bonds in June 1720 reversed the conversion of the debt. The king created 25m in perpetual rents at 2.5%, for a face value of 1000m. Former bondholders who still had their bonds or their liquidation receipts had priority to purchase the new bonds, which could otherwise be bought with notes.
26 In August 1720, the king created a further 8m (later reduced to 6m) in perpetual rents at 2% and 4m in life annuities at 4%, with the explicit goal of exchanging them for high-denomination notes. Of the 48m annual payment owed by the king to the Company since the debt conversion of August 1719, 43m had thus been cancelled; the remaining 5m were assigned to pay for the Company's own bonds (life annuities and "actions rentières" created in February 1720). The debt conversion was thus fully halted, and the national debt was primed for renationalization. In practice, former bondholders were left holding a variety of objects: notes, shares, liquidation certificates, and in some cases the original bonds or debts themselves. For another very confusing 6 months, the government offered means to convert some of these securities into others at various prices and with various promises attached.
One particular outlet for the notes is of interest. The "bank accounts" (comptes en banque) created on July 13 were modelled on the bank accounts of the public banks of Amsterdam and Hamburg, which served to settle large transactions. John Law gave his Bank's accounts a monopoly as means to settle all transactions greater than 500L, wholesale trade, bills of exchange, and they could only be purchased by the deposit of high denomination notes.
Both outlets were slow to take up notes. By July 19, only 159m of rentes had been subscribed (Faure 1977, 471) . As for bank accounts, within three weeks of the opening of the accounts, only 100m of notes had been withdrawn in this manner; the final figure would be 239m.
Another way to retire notes was to convert them into shares. The first attempt was at a capital call of 3000L per share announced on 3 June. Those who made the payment would receive a dividend of 360L per share; those who didn't would only receive a fixed coupon of 200L. Since the number of shares was set at 200,000, this capital call could be expected to soak up 600m in notes. It was clearly not successful, since on 20 June shareholders were authorized to pay in with shares instead of notes, each old share taken at a face value of 6000L: the operation simply amounted to a conversion of 3 old shares into 2 new shares, albeit with an increase in the promised dividend (from 600L for the 3 old shares to 720L for the 2 new ones).
A second attempt at retiring notes was made on July 31 (extended on August 14), with a new issue of shares, again in the form of subscriptions: the price was 9000L, with 1000L down-payment and the rest due over the course of six months. This appeared to have some success, and 70,000 subscriptions were sold. On September 15, however, the subscription scheme was altered: the subscriptions, on which only one payment had been made, were made convertible each into a tenth of share; this conversion was made mandatory on November 1.
Finally, the bank could redeem or buy notes. It did not do much of the former. The Bank's window, closed during the events of late May, reopened on June 12 but only to convert large denominations into small denominations. In July it started to redeem notes in coin, on a very limited basis, but the ensuing melees led to an indefinite suspension on July 17 (Faure 1977, 477-89) . There are indications, however, that the Bank bought notes on the open market, where they traded at a discount (Faure 1977, 501) . See Figure 10 After a very sharp devaluation of the silver currency failed to bring the notes more than briefly back to par in early August, Law decided to jettison the note altogether. On August 15, the government announced its plans concerning their ultimate fate. The demonetization of high-denomination notes was announced for October 1, and that of low-denomination notes for May 1, 1721.
27 The freedom to denominate contracts in gold and silver above 1000L was restored. Until October 1, the notes were still legal tender for debts and taxes (a decree of September 15 limited the validity of both high and low denominations to 50% of any payment except for existing debts). After October 1, the high denominations could only purchase government bonds, bank accounts, or company shares. During the month of October an additional outlet for notes was provided at the mints, where they were taken along with old coins in exchange for new coins. The bank note continued to depreciate, and the demonetization was brought forward. On October 10, the government reckoned that about 700m in notes had been retired and burned, and another 730m retired but not yet burned, 28 leaving an outstanding stock of 1169m, and it considered that there were enough options available for their conversion to 27 The issue of low-denomination notes continued until October; 10% of the notes converted in bonds or bank accounts were returned to the owner in the form of low-denomination notes.
28 The arrêt of October 10 also mentions 90m converted for specie by the Bank, but Dutot omits it. bring forward their demonetization to November 1 for all payments. The Company retained the ability to make their payments for debt service, wages, and dividends, in notes until January 1. The notes remained accepted at face value to purchase the government rentes of June and August 1720.
The bank accounts had been intended to survive the notes. On September 15, Law tried to recreate elements of the System, with the bank account in the role of the note. He created a dual unit of account, one based on the metallic currency, the other on the bank account. The nominal value of bank accounts was reduced by a factor of 4, and the ability to buy them with notes apparently ended. But at the same time, he made it possible to convert shares into bank account balances at a rate of 2000L per share, just as the shares and notes had been convertible into each other in March. This created a nominal exchange rate between bank accounts (which were called nouvellesécritures) and paper currency of 4:1. On October 22, the aggregate amount of bank accounts was limited to 100mL (presumably in bank-account units). They remained the official means of payment for the large transactions detailed above, and foreign exchange was quoted in terms of bank account balances. The dual-unit system was abandoned on December 26, when the bank accounts were overnight demonetized, converted back to paper-currency units (i.e., multiplied by 4), and made exchangeable into government bonds. The bank accounts never proved successful. A total of 407m (in paper-currency units) had been created, consistent with the 100m limit; but of those, only 239m had actually been issued, and 51m were held by the Royal Treasury or the Company, so that only 188m were in fact held by the public (Paris-Duverney 2:.
The Aftermath
Law fled France in early December 1720. Cleaning up the System took several years.
29 The
immediate problem was what to do with the wreckage of the System, namely, the various instruments and securities (company shares, bank notes, bank accounts, government bonds of 1720, company bonds, receipts from various treasurers). All instruments were submitted to a liquidation called the "Visa," managed by seasoned financiers and former rivals of Law, the Paris brothers. The result of the Visa was a newly recreated national debt, in the form of perpetual and life annuities. The Indies Company was put in receivership in April 1721 and emerged again in April 1723; it continued as a trading company until 1769. I review the Visa itself and the ensuing fate of the Company.
The Visa of 1721
After Law left France, individuals were still able to purchase government bonds with the instruments of the System, until Jan 6, 1721, when the government froze such conversions. Three weeks later it ordered all the System's instruments to be submitted to an agency created for that purpose. The owners were required to list the instruments in their possession and explain how they had acquired them. Anything not submitted to the Visa became worthless. This first step was completed by August 1721. The second step was to convert these claims into public debt, "based on the realm's abilities and on the rules of fairness": that is, (a) to reduce the aggregate amount, and (b) to treat the individual claims based on the information submitted. For the aggregate amount, the government announced that it would accept a total debt capital of 1631m, and an annual interest payment of 40m. For the individual allocation problem, the government announced a matrix: the rows were the instruments, the columns were the manner in which they had been acquired (from a reimbursement, from a sale of real estate or personal estate, etc); the entries in the matrix were the coefficient by which the nominal amount was to be reduced.
30 The coefficient ranged from 100% (government bonds traced to a reimbursement) to 5% (any security submitted without explanation).
Applying the matrix to all the claims took over a year, employed thousands of employees, and cost 9mL (Dutot 1935, 2:266) . The regulations governing their activities are intricate 29 The architects of the Visa were the four Paris brothers, former wartime suppliers turned financiers, who were behind the short-lived publicly-held General Farms of 1718-19 and later fell out with John Law. They remained in power until May 1726. There exists no serious study of their career and policies.
30 To check on the statements made by owners concerning the origin of their securities, the government ordered notaries to submit all documents relating to reimbursement and other financial transaction since September 1719.The information collected was then solemnly burned in September 1722 to protect "le secret des familles."
and detailed (see Hautchamp) . Fraud and corruption inevitably occurred, but was harshly repressed. It is hard to see the deployment of so much bureaucratic talent as a default.
The work was completed in September 1722. Claimants were given certificates of liquidation, which they could then convert into government bonds, either perpetual rentes or life annuities. For the purpose of redeeming the certificates, a total of 1700m in capital, 47m in rentes, were created from 1720 to January 1724, slightly more than initially promised.
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What exactly had become of the notes?
( 1) Dutot (1935) .
The total of notes printed (excluding a 100m issue of small denominations which was exchanged for large denominations) was 2822.3m. Of those, 752.6m were burned or ready to be burned as of late November 1720. Others were presented to the Visa, and the number of notes that were never presented to the Visa or converted is known. The remainder was redeemed during 1720, in some form or other, mostly in the form of bonds submitted to the Visa. As Table 7 shows, one can account for most of this remainder (line 5) with the various government and Company bonds submitted to the Visa, but this leaves 544m unaccounted for.
Some consists in shares issued after June 1720 to reduce the circulation. We know that up to 70,000 subscriptions were issued in July 1720, which would account for 70m. Also, up to 500,000 tenths of shares were issued at 800L each in September 1720, which would potentially account for up to 400m shares. But we do not have any information on the number of shares existing in late 1720: we only know that the maximum number was set at 250,000 in September 1720, and only half that amount was submitted to the Visa in January 1721.
31 A few other outlets were also provided for these certificates, such as the purchase of some offices that were recreated, the payment of tax arrears, or the purchase of new coins, since the monetary reform of September 1720 continued until 1724.
One possibility is that this amount consists of notes exchanged for specie between June and October 1720. Recall that Law had proceeded to buy back the metallic stock from March to May 1720; Faure (1977, 378, 385 ) accounts for at least 221m in notes issued for coins at 82.5L per marc. After the July 31 devaluation, the same coins could buy back at par 320m in notes at par, or 550m at market value. That the Bank continued to redeem notes on a selective basis, even after any pretense of convertibility was ended, is apparent: Dutot (2000, 323, 383) complains that 51m in specie held by the mints in late August were all spent to exchange the notes of well-connected owners.
The 2211.2m of Table 7 submitted to the Visa were reduced to to 1700m, a 23.5% average reduction. The authors of the Visa (Paris-Duverney 1740) insist that their goal was to bring back the debt to a sustainable level while maintaining fairness. No claim of 500L or less was reduced: these small claims represent half of the individuals and 40% of the sums involved. This means that the remaining 60% of the sums were reduced by 39% on average. The cash value of the liquidation certificates issued by the Visa was around 25% of face value on the open market in 1722 (Dutot 1935, 2:279) . This means that the average holder of a note ultimately got about 20% of face value in March 1722, which was the market value as of early November 1720.
The Indies Company
The Indies company survived the collapse of the System, after some initial threats. The government decided on January 1721 to hold it accountable for the bank notes; the shareholders strenuously objected that the bank had been merged with the company against the latter's will and had always been a tool of government policy. The government progressively relented; and gave the company the means to continue as a viable commercial enterprise, by absolving it of the System and giving it new monopolies.
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The shares in the Indies Company were also submitted to the Visa. The number of shares was 600,000 as of March 12, 1720, reduced to 200,000 by June 3 as a result of the Company's repurchase program, and the king's gift of the 100,000 he owned to the Company as part of the rescue effort in early June (Dutot 2000, 251, 260) . These were converted into new shares at a 2:3 ratio over the summer, leaving 133,000 new shares. An unknown number of these failed to submit to the "second stamp" of October 1720 (see Appendix). In 1721, only 125,000 shares were presented to the Visa, and they were reduced to 55,735. The market value of shares fluctuated quite a bit after the liquidation, but it averaged about 1000L between March 1722 and August 1723 (Dutot 1935, 2:279) . Given that shares were on average cut by half, this corresponds to the market value of shares in mid-November 1720.
Next, the Company was disentangled from the System. This involved some accounting exercises between Company and government. The government had converted the Company's liabilities into its own bonds, making the Company a debtor of the government. The debt , and in June 1725 a series of edicts absolved it from any further liability for the System, and confirmed its remaining privileges. At the same time, the Company was placed under tighter government supervision, with the finance minister sitting on the board, and made to focus on its "core competencies". It lost the lease on the General Farms and the mints, and the collection of the direct taxes, in January 1721, and the lease on tobacco in July 1721. It initially retained all its trading monopolies, but shed them one after the other as they proved unprofitable or unenforceable, retaining only the monopoly on Canadian furs (which it lost with the treaty of Paris of 1763), the slave trade in Guinea and Senegal, and the trade with India and China (see Table 8 ). The Company continued to operate until August 1769, when its monopoly were suspended; it was liquidated in 1770, and its shares converted into government bonds (Velde and Weir 1992).
The Company share was traded on the market from the end of the Visa in 1722, and Haudrère (1989) .
quotations were reported in newspapers through the 18th century. As Figure 11 shows, the price was quite volatile, both at high frequencies and at low frequencies. The main disruptions are wars: Polish succession in 1733, Austrian succession in the 1740s, and the Seven Years War in the 1750s. The Company was obligated to pay a fixed dividend, initially 150L per year, backed by the commercial profits, and by the tobacco monopoly which the king ceded in 1723 in payment of his debt of 100m (representing the original billets d'Etat brought by the subscribers of 1717-18). A first crisis brought about a suspension in the payment of dividends in January 1745; the dividends of 1744 and 1745 were not paid in cash; instead, the Company took the coupons (wroth 300L) along with a 200L cash payment, and issued in exchange a 5%-bearing bond, which it endeavoured to reimburse over 15 years. When dividend payments resumed, they were set at 80L. A second crisis at the end of the Seven Years War brought about in 1764 a capital call on shareholders in order to maintain the same dividend, and an end to the repurchase of the 1745 bonds. Figure 12 plots the actual dividend payments, with capital calls counted as negative dividends. It also plots the commercial earnings on a per-share basis, and the total net earnings after interest payments. 34 The bulk of commercial revenues (90%) came from trade beyond Cape Hope. Commercial earnings averaged 2.6mL from 1725 to 1769 (64L per share), while total net earnings averaged 7.8mL (162L).
34 Commercial earnings are calculated as the net revenue from sales of imported merchandise less shipping costs (construction, maintenance and fitting of ships, provisions, wages of embarked personnel). Total earnings adds revenues from the tobacco monopoly and deducts interest payments on annuities and on the 1745 loan. Repayments on the 1745 loan are not deducted, as they are counted as (delayed) dividend payments. I haven't yet found data on other expenditures such as personnel and fixed investment in France and the colonies, so the net earnings figure are an upper bound. 
Conclusion
Still incomplete.
Was the System a bubble?
This is an age-old question, one that has been asked in one form or another since 1720. Can the asset prices shown in Figure 4 be justified on the basis of reasonable beliefs about prospective returns on this asset? Several points can be made. It must first be noted that many of the prices shown are not "pure" market prices. John Law had been influencing, if not manipulating, the price of his company's shares for a long time (Lüthy 1:310, 319). As early as May 1718 he was buying futures on the shares of his Company, as a way to publicize his beliefs about future capital gains. But it is in the late fall 1719 that the Company becomes an active participant: it lends 2500L against the security of a share (effectively putting a floor on the share price), then on October 9 it decides to buy back shares from any shareholder at 5000L each (Dutot 2000, 127, 168) , intervenes directly in the market (for example selling for 30m of shares in one week in November to keep down the price); finally, in late December an office is set up to buy and sell shares at prices posted every day 319, 340) . The office operated intermittently until the price of shares was officially pegged at 9000L on March 5; and when it stopped its operations, the share prices faltered. From January 1720 at the latest, probably from November or December 1719, one cannot consider the "market" price to represent anything but Law's policies.
Law's companies paid dividends twice a year, and dividends were announced in advance (see Table 3 ). The announcement made on 29 Dec 1719 is crucial: could the dividend of 200L per share announced by Law justify the "market" price of shares of 9000L?
Look at expected earnings (but what appropriate discount factor?) Law counted that he needed revenues of 85m to pay the 200L dividend to 424,000 shares: he was omitting 100,000 shares repurchased by the Company and a like amount owned by the King (the King would ultimately give the shares for free to the Company in June 1720). He presented some estimates of likely earnings to the general assembly, and Dutot presented slightly lower estimates (see Table 9 ). Harsin (1928, 174) , Dutot (2000, 246) .
The minting profit was obviously a one-time gain, which Law could not expect to make on a continuous basis, especially given his plan to replace gold and silver with paper money.
The tobacco monopoly was actually underestimated: Table 10 reports information on lease prices paid by successive farmers and, when known, the farmers' profits. The average revenue from 1724 to 1789 was about 25m L (at 60L/marc), from which a lease price must be deducted (in 1719, the Company paid 3m per year, but, as with the General Farms below, the difficulty is in estimating what lease prices would be negotiated in the future). Table 9 assumes a 10m profit.
Trade was overestimated, as the information presented above on the Indies company after 1720 indicates. The average dividend paid per share, inclusive of repurchases of shares in 1730-33, is 117L (at 60L/marc) or 6.5m in aggregate, in 1719 livres.
The most difficult piece to estimate is the profit on the general farms. The price of Law's lease was 52m, which was an increase over the previous lease of 1718 (48m). Harsin (1928, 146) states that the profit during the lease year 1720 was 90.4mL, but he does not take into account the fact that the livre was on average at 80/marc during that period: at 60L/marc, this would amount to 67.6mL, or a 15.6mL profit; which is the profit claimed by the Company after the fact, in April 1721 (Giraud 1966, 3:80) . There is evidence that profits would have increased over the next few years. The Farms were managed directly by the government for the next few years, and, according to White (2001) , the receipts rose from 61mL in 1721 to 91.5mL in 1725 in that period. That would have yielded an average Table 10 : Total revenues of the tobacco monopoly, broken down into lease price and farmers' profits, in current livres. Notes: the lease years run from October 1 to September 30. The Company owned the monopoly from 1724 to 1747, and did not farm it from 1724 to 1730, hence there is no lease price for those years. Sources: Dutot (1935, 2:222-26) , Morellet (1769, 51), Marion (1923, 525), Clamageran (3:254, 402, 444) , Matthews (1958, 129-30) .
profit of 22.8mL, but these would not have lasted. During the Carlier lease which followed (1726-32), the average profit was 4.9mL (5.9mL in 1719 livres), but over a lease price of 80mL. That is, the government ratcheted up the lease price when the lease came up for renewal. The experience of the 18th century suggests that the government might leave in the 5-15m range as profit to the Farms. Of course, had Law's System continued in place, the government's power and incentives in its bargaining with the Company would have been quite different, knowing in particular that part of the profit it was leaving to the Company would have been paid to former bondholders.
As Table 9 shows, it is not too difficult to come up with an estimate in the same ballpark as Law's projection, and one can justify a 200L dividend in steady state. Does this justify a valuation of 9000L per share, a P/E ratio of 45?
If we look a the Indies Company after 1725, we see that the P/E ratio fluctuated widely, from 4.5 to 23.7, and averaged 13.5.
